Thursday, February 22, 2024
HomePakistan1965 war - A saga of Indian defeat

1965 war – A saga of Indian defeat

“In the Jammu-Sialkot sector, the Indian Army massed the largest chunk of its might ie 1 Corps consisting of one Armoured Division (one Armoured Brigade and one Lorried Brigade), two Infantry Divisions and one Mountain Division. However, 1 Corps did not achieve proportionate results. Here again, bad generalship at the Corps and the Divisional levels, and lack of co-operation among the formations, were responsible for their poor showing”.
These quotes are from chapter 12 of the Indian Official History of 1965 war. The Indian official history is full of such observations about the inefficiency of their military leadership during the 1965 war that ultimately led them to defeat. On the morning of 6th September when Indian forces crossed into Pakistan territory in the Burki Sector, the higher ups had assured their under command that they would have their breakfast in Lahore. But in the next few days the Indian Army was to learn that a nation’s spirit could never be taken lightly. Interaction 1965 saga
An American Radio Service journalist Rai Milan writes in his war diary, “I want to bring it on record that India is claiming victory but on ground there is no evidence to support Indian claims. What I see is only destroyed Indian tanks and huge logistic support units rolling towards their forward area. During my long journalistic career spanning over two decades, I have never seen a group of such confident individuals as the victorious Pakistani soldiers fighting against Indians”.
According to Wikipedia Encyclopaedia analysis about 1965 war, the invasion of Pakistan by the Indian Army was a strategic blunder. The Indian Army failed to analyse the real potential of the Pakistan Army that resulted in their defeat. The official history of the 1965 war drafted by the Indian Ministry in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22, when the Security Council was pressing for a cease-fire, the Indian Prime Minister asked General Choudhri if India could possibly win the war, he would delay accepting the cease-fire for a little while longer. The General replied that most of India’s frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered tank losses.
It was revealed later that only 14% of India’s frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan. By this time the Pakistan Army had used up about 80% of its ammunition. Air Chief Marshal (Retired) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of co-ordination between the IAF and the Indian Army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Indian Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhri did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. There are hundreds of other blunders by the Indian intelligence and their field commanders.
Pakistan Army, with the backing of its entire nation, stood like a cemented wall against the Indian onslaught at all fronts. At the Sialkot front, one Indian Infantry, one Armoured Division and an Armoured Brigade were repulsed by an Infantry Division. Fifteen Indian attacks were repulsed only at Chawinda-Philora Sectors. India had to face the biggest humiliation at Lahore front, where thirteen of their attacks were repulsed. At Kasur, The Pakistani forces not only repulsed many Indian attacks but went deep into India and captured a substantial chunk of their territory. The spirited Pakistani nation faced the Indian might boldly and defeated them at all fronts. There have been rare examples of extreme valour and courage in the military history as were witnessed during the 1965 war both by Pakistani nation and soldiers. Despite numerical superiority, Indians were humiliated at all fronts in sea, air and ground. The war that India imposed on Pakistan on September 6, 1965 was the product of several years of constant and deliberate planning in New Delhi. The underlying Indian philosophy behind this aggressive attack on a smaller neighbor, Pakistan, was to take revenge of the division of India in 1947 and an endeavor to reverse the freedom and independence of the Muslims of Pakistan. The war that continued with full resolve and determination in the ranks and file of Pakistan Armed Forces proved once and forever, that the valiant Pakistani soldiers, backed by a resolute nation, were not to be cowed down by the Indian threats and intimidations.

RELATED ARTICLES

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

Most Popular