Sanaullah
A delegation headed by Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, arrived in Kabul on the morning of September 4, 2021. Lindsy Hilsum, a Channel 4 journalist, asked the general in the lobby of the Serena Hotel, “Will you be meeting senior people in the Taliban?” The Inter-Services Intelligence chief said, “No, I’m not clear”, and looked towards the Pakistan ambassador to Kabul, Mansoor Ahmad Khan, who was standing by his side, to respond to the question.
But before Khan said anything, the journalist posed another question: “What do you hope is going to happen now in Afghanistan?”.
“I have just landed,” Hameed said and once again looked towards Khan, who remarked, “We are working for peace and stability in Afghanistan.”
At this, Hameed smiled and said, “Don’t worry, everything will be okay.” He took a sip of tea to wrap up the informal news talk. Later, Afghan news channel TOLO News confirmed that the purpose of the surprise visit was to resolve differences aroused between Mullah Brader and Haqqani Networks for power sharing.
After the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Pakistani power circles exhibited mixed reactions to their triumph. They were hopeful that now there would be an end to cross-border violations by terrorist groups in both border provinces, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The policymakers were also dreaming of vibrant cooperation from the new regime against Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideouts, mostly dwelling in Pakistani border areas. However, things did not go as Pakistan had thought. TTP’s terrorist activities surged by 93% compared to the last eight years. Over 100 terror attacks since the fall of Kabul were mainly planned to hit security installations and forces in Pakistani tribal areas. These lethal attacks killed dozens of officers and hundreds of soldiers. The local population residing in those parts is terribly facing insecurity and anxiety in the growing war situation.
Since the inception of the Taliban’s reclaim of power, Pakistan has made several attempts to mount diplomatic pressure on the Mulla Haibatullah-led government to bring the TTP to the table for fruitful talks. The regime expressed no gravity on demands for the eradication of TTP at large due to their vested interests. Instead, the Taliban insisted on ettling TTP in tribal areas.
The Kandahari Taliban group in the Afghan government, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Defense Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar, have repeatedly reiterated that the TTP is their valuable asset that played a vital role in their resistance in Afghanistan. These intents of support to TTP overtly embarked on Pak-TTP peace talks, mediated by the Taliban government, where Kabul put no diplomatic apparatus of strain on TTP against its unjust demand for military withdrawal from the Federally Administrative Tribal Area (FATA) and restoration of its previous status for their exclusive control. These demands are also captivating for the Taliban, as FATA has played a key role as a strategic backyard for Taliban sects since the Soviet invasion of 1979. Although Pakistan agreed to reduce military installations and the provisional settlement of TTP, the reversal of the 25th Amendment in Pakistan’s constitution was turned down. Resultantly, so-called peace talks could not go far but could ceasefire for a short time. Beyond everything, a Pakistani wonders: What are the prevalent reasons behind this Taliban mindset to keep Pakistan at arm’s length?
The academics find it in the dramatic geostrategic changes. The present Taliban organization is quite different from the organization that was in power in the 1990s. The former Taliban regime evolved during the eight-year-long civil war, followed by the Soviet withdrawal, which had unequivocal financial and combat support from international jihadist organizations and Pakistan. The government ruled under the vivacious leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar was not regionally well-matched in power dynamics but endowed Pakistan with strategic and security assurances along its western borders.
The Mullah Haibatullah-led Taliban regime is ahead of Mullah Omar’s political approach. This generation was largely cultivated in the twenty-year-long combat resistance against a foreign power. This time, it came with greater success in Afghanistan. It scrapped the Ghani government, maneuvered local resistance, and seized a larger part of the power to rule, de facto recognition, diplomatic contacts with the neighbors, and the complete withdrawal of the United States-led forces.
They have the top attribute of smugness of a conclusive victory over the United States, with the distinctions of insufficient possessions, meager resources, and poor communication. These attributes shaped its behavior of self-proclamation as the sole authoritative entity in disarray in Afghanistan, whose worth is undeniable in pursuing peace on this Asian side at large. Thus, this identity does not entail endorsement of Pakistan or the Middle East as compared to their past regime.
The second Islamic Emirate is skillfully capitalizing on its instrumental role in de-Americanizing the region, which is supposed to be a keystone for confidence-building measures with China, Russia, and Iran. In this context, the Taliban regime gained huge success in January 2024. China took a step forward to engage the regime in regional and multilateral trade and security dynamics. A trade deal is struck between the heads of mining, telecommunications, and infrastructure building with the backing of the Belt and Road initiative.
China is also interested in the Taliban playing a role in the East Turkistan Islamic Movement’s (ETIM) whereabouts in Afghanistan. This terrorist organization is mainly involved in insurgencies in the Xinjiang province of China. Russia also seeks security measures in its backyard, the central Asian states, at the crucial time when it is confronting the Ukraine issue. Russia embarks on a security assurance with the Taliban for not hosting any rebellious force against it. In short, the Second Emirate’s de jure recognition is predominantly conditional on its assurance of not hosting any terrorist group.
However, it is not so easy for the Taliban government to go straight for normalization. It is clear that the defeat of the United States is chiefly due to its institutional and geostrategic incompetence. A key reason was the overwhelming pouring of billions of dollars into defense functions and the malicious overlooking of the socio-democratic state system. It was apparent that in the absence of a truly representative-based parliament, an efficient executive, and a constitutionally protected judiciary, the Afghan government would be destined to collapse. Another factor in making the Taliban victorious was the failure to expand the security stakes of neighboring countries associated with the survival of the Afghan government in the long run. By closing the Doha Agreement without the clauses of effective assurance, the United States wasted Indian investment, left an insurgency threat for China, Russia, and Iran, and created insecurity for Pakistan. The absence of engagements by regional powers followed an opportunity for de facto recognition for the winner of the lumberjack match played in the field of Afghanistan, where the Taliban, of course, earned prominence.
They took advantage of the flaws and seized Kabul, and now the same subjects have become challenges for them to a greater extent of intensity. Subsequently, the regime change brought no change in the socio-economic conditions on the ground, and we are presently facing enormous food security and national security issues. Persistence in these ruthless issues could weaken the Taliban’s grip and create space for local warlords and other terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Khorasan wing.
The Taliban government has an immense need to involve China and Russia in closer ties with characteristics of security and strategic gears in the existing pattern of China-led peace and cooperation in the region. In the second part of the Doha Agreement signed on February 29, 2020, the Taliban explicitly embarks on making sure any of its members, other individuals, or groups use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
This assurance from the Taliban must be extended to its neighboring countries as well. Pakistan is the most affected country by the two-decade-long war against terrorism and is still paying the cost in the socio-economic and security realms.
The policymakers of Pakistan have consistently attempted to remove concerns, but their compromising tactics against the TTP indicate uncertainty and instability on Afghan borders, which are building mistrust and disinterest on both sides. Now it is time to channel regional pressure on the Haibatullah’s administration to tie their attempts at goodwill in the region with the tangible actions taken against the obliteration of TTP on their soil after the withdrawal of the United States.
After all, the responsibility of peace and security principally lays on the part of the Taliban to keep the same line of not hosting their soil against any of its bordering states. The assertion should be to bring the Taliban regime under the umbrella of collective security assurance on a regional canvas, and for this purpose, there is a much-needed requisition to glorify their pragmatic actions against TTP as the test case for their claim of adaptability to security concerns.
From the perspective of increasing security and power collaboration between Russia and China, the case of the Taliban necessitates mutual assured political will for the instrumental role of non-interference, behavioral change about Pakistan, and sociopolitical reforms in its structure for continuity of cooperation.
The author is a Freelance Researcher and a graduate of International Relations, University of Karachi.
