Sanaullah
Glenn Snyder, one of the most prolific scholars on alliances, suggested that a security dilemmaa key concern in realist analysisexists not only between potential adversaries but also between allies. This alliance security dilemma arises because states have imperfect information, rely on their own threat perceptions, and can never be completely certain of their allies’ behaviour.
Consequently, states face two potential outcomes: entrapment or abandonment. Entrapment occurs when an alliance drags a state into an unwanted conflict, while abandonment leaves the state vulnerable at its moment of greatest insecurity. Pakistan’s strategic foreign policy, in many ways, aligns with Snyder’s analysis of the alliance system.
National security doctrines evolve gradually and are shaped by institutional factors unless disrupted by drastic events. After its inception, Pakistan had to craft its national security and strategic objectives within the Cold War regime, facing a perceived security threat from India, primarily fuelled by the Kashmir dispute. Given its colonial legacy, Pakistan opted to join the democratic-capitalist bloc led by the United States.
Pakistan’s premier, Liaqat Ali Khan, successfully presented Pakistan’s case to the United States by highlighting its geo-strategic significance. This importance became crucial under the US strategic doctrine of containment following the Korean War. The newly independent Pakistan became a natural ally for the United States due to its geographic position. Its western wing was close to Central and Middle Eastern Asia, allowing for the containment of potential communist expansion towards the Indian Ocean, while its eastern wing neighboured East Asia. As a result, Pakistan and the United States signed a mutual defence assistance agreement in May 1954.
This strategic alignment led to the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in February 1955. These alliances were part of the US strategy to contain communist influence from the Middle East to the Pacific. In return, Pakistan was guaranteed military and economic assistance. However, these alliances could not fully address Pakistan’s primary security dilemma: the growing threat from India. SEATO and CENTO, ill-suited for Pakistan’s regional concerns, failed to respond to India’s increasingly aggressive border security policies, particularly in relation to Pakistan’s eastern wing.
The situation worsened when Arab allies distanced themselves following nationalist military coups, and relations between India, the Arab states, and Western powers grew closer. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet split and the onset of détente in US-Soviet relations in the 1960s further complicated Pakistan’s security situation. During this period, Pakistan felt abandoned by its allies. It faced Indian military aggression twice, which ultimately led to the disintegration of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and the loss of its eastern wing, shrinking its strategic footprint to South Asia.
The experiment of integrating into collective security pacts, driven by geo-strategic considerations, proved disastrous for Pakistan’s national security. Scholars have debated the causes of Pakistan’s abandonment by its allies. A major factor was Pakistan’s willingness to compromise on its regional and border issues. Pakistan’s security dilemma was primarily driven by the Kashmir issue, which dragged it into Cold War bipolar politics.
However, it fell victim to the larger interests of the great powers. Additionally, SEATO and CENTO lacked socio-political cohesiveness, aside from their alliance with the United States. CENTO, for example, comprised Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan, while SEATO included countries like Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The main aim of these alliances was to protect capitalist interests in the Middle East and the Pacific, while South Asia was not a priority.
The 1970s saw significant changes in international political and strategic affairs. Arab nationalism, led by socialist dictators, gained popularity in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia emerged as a regional power. In Iran, the Pahlavi monarchy was replaced by a conservative religious regime following a revolution. In Asia, the United States was forced to withdraw after its defeat in the Vietnam War, while India tested its first nuclear weapon.
During this time, diplomatic relations between the US and China were also established. Pro-American regimes were overthrown in several African and South American countries. These shifts in the global order forced Pakistan to re-evaluate its strategic objectives to meet new challenges related to national security and territorial integrity. Consequently, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO and CENTO and distanced itself from Cold War bipolar politics by joining the Non-Aligned Movement. It also organised and hosted a conference of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) in Lahore, promoting the idea of an Islamic political bloc. In addition to this, Pakistan deepened its relations with China, shifting towards socio-strategic cooperation in the context of regional interests. This redefined Pakistan’s foreign policy, placing it in a socio-political and geo-strategic context both regionally and globally.
However, these efforts were soon disrupted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan’s geography, long a source of both challenges and benefits, again placed it at the centre of a major conflict. The Soviet invasion became a decisive proxy war between global powers, and Pakistan found itself as a frontline state against Soviet expansion. It received significant financial and political support from anti-Soviet countries, along with billions of dollars in military aid and militant support.
This conflict, though not formalised in alliance agreements, was a circumstantial partnership driven by specific objectives. However, the war took a heavy toll on Pakistan, with the influx of millions of Afghan refugees, the rise of religious militant factions, and the burden of a prolonged dictatorial regime contributing to institutional collapse after the war. The national crisis persisted into the second phase of the Afghan conflict, labelled the “War on Terror.”
In this second phase, spanning from roughly 1980 to 2021, Pakistan’s security dilemma continued. None of the major powers involved showed interest in resolving Pakistan’s core issue: the Kashmir dispute and securing its borders to ensure its territorial integrity. Instead, Pakistan’s security vulnerabilities increased, especially after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite offering tacit support to the Taliban, relations between Pakistan and the group deteriorated after the Taliban came to power.
The earlier supportive stance turned into one of hostility, with diplomatic and economic pressure, as well as the growing issue of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Meanwhile, in August 2019, India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A from its constitution, revoking the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. This politically charged move was met with a weak response in Pakistan’s favour from the international community.
Today, Pakistan’s security situation has worsened due to the rise of militant groups and ongoing threats of internal insurgencies. The country faces its worst economic crisis, a direct consequence of its entrapment in unwanted conflicts. Pakistan has been plunged into economic instability, political volatility, institutional weakness, and social uncertainty, creating a war-torn environment.
At this critical juncture, Pakistan requires a cohesive strategy that addresses both immediate security concerns and long-term stability. Merely relying on its geo-strategic significance will not be enough to achieve its national security objectives in an economic sense. Pakistan’s leadership must realign its strategic partnerships in a global economic paradigm, leveraging its geography within the changing dynamics of international cooperation and mutual assistance.
Sanaullah, is a freelance researcher and a graduate of International Relations from the University of Karachi.
