Sanaullah
In a private conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman stated that he doesn’t care about the Palestinian issue, according to a feature article on the conflict in Gaza published in The Atlantic. However, the 39-year-old prince emphasized that the Palestinian issue is important for regional stability, noting that 70% of the population, which is younger than he is, does not know much about it.
This current conflict is introducing them to the topic for the first time, which he considers significant. The Saudi authorities later deemed his remarks to be incorrect. According to the article’s author, Franklin Foer, these comments were made during Blinken’s visit to Al-Ula in Madina province in January of this year.
The recent escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict began in early October 2023 when Hamas executed Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, targeting southern Israeli cities. This operation, conceived by Yahiya Sinwar, involved launching more than a hundred rockets across the Gaza Strip in a surprise attack, resulting in numerous casualties and hundreds of Israeli hostages.
One day after the October 7 attack, the Israeli cabinet formally announced Operation Swords of Iron, aimed specifically at destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages. Following directives from the Ministry of Defense, the Israeli defense forces initiated a complete siege of Gaza. This marked a significant escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in several decades.
It is estimated that since last October, Israel has dropped 70,000 tons of explosives on 365 square kilometers of the Gaza Strip, surpassing World War II bombings in Dresden, Hamburg, and London combined, according to Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor. Israel’s retaliation has resulted in over 42,000 deaths in Gaza within a year, creating a severe humanitarian crisis. By the end of this escalation, Israel expanded its war objectives to Lebanon and entered a new phase, launching targeted offensives in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Yemen to dismantle the so-called axis of resistance.
Reactions from Middle Eastern governments, particularly in the Gulf, have varied significantly depending on their specific relationships with Israel. Nonetheless, popular sentiment among Muslim communities has largely been in support of the Palestinians. The United Arab Emirates criticized Hamas’ aggression, while Saudi Arabia adopted a neutral posture, emphasizing the importance of resolving conflicts through dialogue.
Qatar, on the other hand, took a more pro-Palestinian stance and publicly blamed Israeli bombardments on Gaza, reflecting its close ties with Hamas. Qatar’s foreign office is also attempting a mediation strategy between Israel and Hamas. However, it has suspended its work as a mediator in ceasefire and hostage release talks between Israel and Hamas after the US presidential election.
The reactions from the Middle East are part of a complex, multi-pronged response shaped by various events from the decade of the Arab Spring. During this era, Middle Eastern geopolitics transformed from a system organized around traditional Sunni-Shia and oil-based security architectures into a multipolar system characterized by a lack of norms, institutions, or balancing mechanisms to constrain conflicts and the use of force.
The conventional dynamics of Arab power politics, characterized by an oil-driven economy, a focus on Israel, and an ethno-religious societal structure during the Cold War, featuring three dominant hubs in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, have fractured into arenas of internal and regional conflicts. This decline stems less from a lack of capabilities than from policy choices and an inability to translate those capabilities into meaningful outcomes. The legitimacy crisis in Iraq, the instability in Libya following Gaddafi’s fall, and the devastating civil war in Syria have all contributed to a fundamental transformation of the region’s strategic and security frameworks.
The Syrian civil war, in particular, became a focal point for regional struggles and global conflicts. The war eroded the Assad regime’s strength against rebel forces and saw jihadist organizations enter the fray. Arab Gulf monarchies provided arms and financial support to select rebel factions, leading to complicated alliances among global powers, regional states, and non-state actors.
Similarly, the pro-Assad alliance in the Syrian war consisted mainly of Assad’s forces, supported by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. This phenomenon has characterized the region as multipolar in every sense military, economic, ideological highlighting a distinct lack of balance of power. This shift has outlined changing national security and strategic trends in the Middle East, where Gulf countries (Saudi Arab, Oman, Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar) have emerged as central power brokers.
In this context, the vibrant leadership of Riyadh, under Mohammad Bin Salman, has crafted a unique strategic security framework. This landscape features the prominent involvement of Asian actors, including China, India, and Israel, in the Persian Gulf, aiming to establish a new security regime that reduces overwhelming dependency on Western military support.
The regime’s priorities focus on protecting airspace and maritime zones, engaging in transnational defense collaborations, and investing in drones and surveillance technologies. To realize this evolving security regime, the Gulf region is pursuing diplomatic rapprochement with Iran, establishing a loose regional security framework that includes Israel, and fostering new political and economic ties with India and China.
However, the recent development of exclusive security ties with Israel extending its influence to the Persian Gulf, strategically expanding the regional outline to address potential threats from Iran and its proxies. The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020, normalized relations between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel with Saudi Arabia’s facilitation.
This accord is particularly significant as it followed the near-collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after the US withdrew in May 2018. It opened a window of opportunity for the signatory Gulf countries to enhance their military capabilities, intelligence sharing, and defense infrastructures. After the US withdrew its backing from the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen, Operation Restoring Hope, in February 2021, the Gulf States sought to engage other actors in strategic partnerships.
Saudi Arabia signed a strategic cooperation deal with Russia in August 2021, followed by a rare visit from Russian President Putin to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in December 2023. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia welcomed China’s mediation efforts for reconciliation with Iran, coupled with plans for a Chinese military base in the UAE, signaling enhanced Sino-Gulf relations. Saudi Arabia’s Communications and Electronics Systems Company also inked an agreement with a Chinese tech company for joint drone design and manufacturing. The UAE signed an agreement with China to acquire a fleet of L-15 advanced jet trainers, while both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are considering purchases of French Rafale fighter aircraft.
India’s strategic investments in the Middle East have deepened through a diverse regional diplomacy, exemplified by the I2U2 (India, Israel, the US, and the UAE), which has emerged in the context of the Abraham Accords. Additionally, Indo-Gulf relations have found new common ground in strategic partnerships and intelligence sharing, particularly regarding the security of economic sea routes in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Evidently, the Gulf States have a growing appetite to integrate regional and extra-regional strategic interests into their socio-economic paradigm. They are shifting from fossil fuel based economy to tourism, ethno-religious society into an open and modern society. They have also recalibrated their strategic priorities to enhance their capabilities as regional powers in a multipolar environment, characterized as a nexus for peaceful socio-economic and strategic interactions among global actors.
This determined quest for a new security landscape necessitates conflict-averse behavior in both regional and international arenas. In the current Israel-Hamas conflict, the Gulf States generally maintain a cautious and largely impartial stance.
However, significant roadblocks remain in achieving the desired security landscape. The Saudi-led Gulf States must develop a viable political roadmap to address the Palestinian issue, potential threats from Iran-Israel skirmishes, the vulnerability of the Red Sea due to ongoing Houthi attacks, political discord between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the persistent influence of terrorist organizations in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Furthermore, newly elected President Donald Trump is expected to have a considerable impact on the region, as his previous administration persuaded its bizarre role in the changing security precedence in addressing long-standing conflicts. Currently, Israel is carrying out unrestricted military operations in neighboring nations, anticipating significant backing from the forthcoming Trump administration in the long term. Meanwhile, Arab nations are hopeful that the US will play a positive role in resolving conflicts to promote their vision for modernization in the region. In both scenarios, the aspect of aiding militant groups in the area to attain their objectives becomes irrelevant.
The author is a freelance researcher and a graduate of International Relations from the University of Karachi.
