Wajeeha Najam
Lebanon has been in a state of political and economic turmoil for years, intensified by the 2020 Beirut port explosion, which severely damaged the country’s economy and left lasting scars on its infrastructure. Civil unrest and economic hardships have only worsened, fueled by political deadlock and sectarian divisions.
Lebanon’s governance remains fragmented, with political factions often split along religious and sectarian lines, making it difficult to implement unified policies. External intervention and proxy conflicts have further deepened these divisions, particularly with Iran-backed Hezbollah using significant influence in the southern part of the country, while Western and Saudi Arabian allies compete for control over the central government.
In this volatile environment, the 2024 pager explosions took place. Reports indicate that outdated communication devices, once common in Lebanon, were rigged with explosives and strategically placed in public spaces across Beirut and other cities. These explosives were detonated in close succession, causing significant damage and loss of life.
The legal implications of these events touch on several key issues. First, the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in international law, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, prohibits states from interfering in the domestic affairs of other nations. If Israeli intelligence carried out these operations in Lebanon, it would be seen as a violation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Such acts could be categorized as foreign intervention, which is generally prohibited under international law unless justified by self-defence or authorized by the UN Security Council. The planting of explosives in Hezbollah-controlled areas would be a direct infringement upon Lebanon’s sovereignty, particularly if done without the government’s knowledge or consent.
Additionally, the use of force, as outlined under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. While Hezbollah is not a traditional state actor, its significance as a non-state military force in Lebanon complicates the situation.
If Israeli intelligence planted these explosives to cause destruction or kill within Lebanese territory, it could be viewed as an unlawful use of force. This could even be seen as an act of aggression under customary international law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which defines aggression as the use of force by one state against another in violation of the UN Charter.
Under international law, state responsibility holds that a state is liable for the actions of its agents, including intelligence services, if they violate international norms. Therefore, if Israeli intelligence acted illegally, Israel could be held responsible for the consequences of these actions. Lebanon might seek reparations or raise the issue in an international forum such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that Israel violated its sovereignty and unlawfully used force within its borders.
Israel may attempt to justify its actions under the right to self-defence, as permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel has long considered Hezbollah a significant security threat due to the group’s military capabilities and rocket attacks targeting Israeli territory.
However, the principle of self-defence is limited by the criteria of necessity and proportionality. Any use of force must be directly linked to an immediate threat, and Israel would need to demonstrate that planting explosives in Hezbollah-controlled areas was necessary to prevent an imminent attack. The ‘Caroline Test,’ a key doctrine in international law, stipulates that self-defence must be immediate and unavoidable, leaving no alternative for addressing the threat. Proving that the use of pagers rigged with explosives was the only available option could be challenging for Israel.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is also relevant, as it applies to both state and non-state actors engaged in armed conflict. Hezbollah, though a non-state actor, is bound by IHL principles concerning the protection of civilians. If Israeli intelligence targeted Hezbollah members involved in military operations, it could be justified under IHL, which allows the targeting of combatants. However, if civilians were harmed, or if the explosive devices indiscriminately affected non-combatants, this would violate the principle of distinction, which requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between military targets and civilians.
The involvement of Taiwan, as the manufacturer of the pagers used in the explosions, introduces additional complexity. While Taiwan could face scrutiny if it knowingly supplied devices for use in acts of violence, its legal responsibility would be limited if its role was merely as a manufacturer without knowledge of their intended use.
Finally, the use of explosives in intelligence operations borders on covert warfare, which is regulated by both international legal frameworks governing espionage and the use of force. While espionage itself operates in a legal grey zone, actions that result in direct harm, such as the planting of explosives, fall under the prohibitions outlined in the UN Charter and international humanitarian law.
The author is a Research Officer at Rabita Forum International (RFI).
