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Keynote address by AD NCA, Lt Gen (R) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai NI, HI, HI(M) at a seminar titled “the future of deterrence and emerging challenges” at ISIS

NOTE: To commemorate the 27th anniversary of Youm-e-Takbeer – the day Pakistan became a nuclear power – the Arms Control and Disarmament Centre at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) hosted a seminar titled “The Future of Deterrence and Emerging Challenges” on May 28, 2025. The event featured Lieutenant General (R) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai NI, HI, HI(M), Advisor Development National Command Authority (AD NCA), as the Chief Guest, who delivered a compelling keynote address offering deep insights into modern deterrence theory and South Asia’s evolving strategic dynamics. Reflecting on the recent 87-hour escalation-cum-retaliation conflict between India and Pakistan, General Kidwai introduced the concept of a “new normal” characterized by Pakistan’s restored air dominance, strengthened conventional deterrent, and the enduring credibility of its nuclear posture. Given the depth and significance of his address delivered amid a period of regional volatility and strategic recalibration it is presented here in full for the benefit of readers, scholars, and policymakers.

Ambassador Khalid Mahmood, Ambassador Sohail Mahmood, ladies and gentlemen. Assalam Alaikum and good morning.

It gives me immense pleasure to be here at this important Seminar organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on The Future of Deterrence and Emerging Challenges. This is a very pertinent topic and currently most relevant because we have just three weeks ago gone through a very intense and challenging 4 day escalation-cum-retaliation mini war between India and Pakistan which emerged literally out of nowhere, and was over in 87 hours, or three and a half days. The war, probably the shortest in modern times, not only tested the limits of deterrence both conventional and nuclear, but both sides also employed and tested a variety of modern technologies, some from within the category of what are popularly termed as emerging technologies.

I am particularly happy to note that the Seminar has been timed to mark the 27th Anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 28th and 30th May 1998 in response to India’s nuclear tests of 11th and 13th May. In fact, today, that is, on the 28th of May, Pakistan had conducted its first series of nuclear tests and thereby became the 7th nuclear weapons power. The disturbed strategic balance of South Asia as well as the dynamics of deterrence were re-established inside two weeks. Pakistan had demonstrated in style the acquisition of The Great Equalizer. The ghost of Pakistan’s relative asymmetry in conventional forces was laid to rest. It was indeed Pakistan’s finest hour.

Unfortunately, however, the story didn’t end here. We did not live happily ever after. As the dynamics of deterrence and warfare go, the shutting of the doors by Pakistan to India’s large scale conventional war gave rise to a new phenomenon. Seeing its large conventional capabilities neutralized because of Pakistan’s nuclear force structure based on the policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence, India started conducting a relentless war, which continues even as I speak, by a variety of other means as a deflective effect of nuclearization of South Asia. India openly started and brazenly owned the conduct of trans-border terrorist operations in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on our western borders. This of course troubles no one in the west. For the conduct of conventional operations on our eastern borders, India came up with a toned down, climb down strategy for war fighting at a less grand scale. From the rather expansive Cold Start Doctrine to the Dynamic Response Strategy (DRS). More on this a little later when I talk about the recent escalation. First my views on technology.

 In the world that we live in today, there can be no two opinions on the reality that Technology is King. Whether in our normal mundane everyday life or at the higher strategic and national security plane, modern lifestyles as well as national security strategies are built and woven around the wonders of technologies. It has been so for many decades of the modern era in which we have grown up but in recent times, for at least the last one decade or so, cutting edge technology in almost every sphere of our lives has moved and touched us at a breath taking pace, a super surge if I may. Companies making a simple everyday device like a mobile phone come up with a new model every 6 months with mind boggling upgrades. In Japan even toilet flushes have not been spared and are embedded with dozens of silly functions available to you to ponder. In almost all aspects of human endeavor, technological advances continue to lead and set trends, even life styles, to which modern life, nations, national policies, are expected to adjust and adopt, or else, lag behind peer competitors at the risk of losing out with consequences in a variety of fields ranging from multi-dimensional sectors of national security, economic growth, developmental goals, GDPs, health, education, even travel and leisure, etc, etc. Most of these technologies cannot be confined in straight jackets. These have cross applications in a variety of our everyday lives. While some may be more relevant to civil applications, the same may also be relevant to military applications, and vice versa. Emerging cutting edge technologies rule the roost in today’s world, and nations had better keep abreast or lose out.

As one simple example, I’ll mention the wonder technology of microchips because it is the heart and soul of all modern technologies. Indeed, I might venture to say that in many ways, microchips are central to the ongoing trade war between the US and China, where too an uneasy cease fire has been agreed upon. Microchips are at the core of most cutting edge technologies imbedded whether in Artificial Intelligence, robotics, cyber warfare, drones, hypersonic missiles, space technologies, communications, energy, electronic warfare, and in a variety of civil and military applications, many of which were on display during our recent 4 day war. No wonder that the microchip has been labeled by some as the new oil because it is relevant to technological sovereignty and geo-political rivalries.

In principle, I would say that all technologies including emerging technologies which are employed for military purposes generate a profound effect on the development of weapons, and on warfighting tactics and strategies. By implication therefore the strategic effects so generated impact the maintenance of military and strategic balance between adversaries in a conflict region. And because strategic balance between adversaries is a guarantor of regional peace, as indeed strategic imbalance is an invitation to aggression and breakdown of peace, one can safely conclude that emerging technologies based on cutting edge technologies are directly linked to the preservation of peace between two or more adversaries through the generation of strategic deterrence effects of technologies. Can we then say perhaps that technology and deterrence go hand in hand?

In the context of South Asia that is between India and Pakistan, any strategic imbalance induced through the induction of these technologies for military purposes by India would most certainly affect deterrence stability in South Asia. Therefore for Pakistan particularly it is imperative to ensure that it does not allow such strategic imbalances to be induced that will negatively affect the delicate strategic balance that Pakistan has worked so hard to establish through the acquisition of a robust nuclear weapons capability as The Great Equalizer in an operational environment of relative conventional asymmetry in selected areas of conventional forces.

Some of the emerging technologies have been around for quite some time now, and are relevant and vital particularly to the security environments of countries like Pakistan which are located in international crush zones and have to bear the brunt of the cross currents of international geo-political power play, east-west, north-south as these play out in our region even as I speak. In addition to the interplay of the cross currents of international geo-political power play, Pakistan continues to bear the strategic consequences of the unfinished agenda of the partition of India with the unresolved conflict over Kashmir with India. Therefore for Pakistan’s national security dynamics, and for strategic stability in South Asia, the geopolitical challenges translate into a variety of threat scenarios, ranging from the good old fashioned contact warfare to non-contact warfare like Hybrid war, 5th Generation war, and the evolving notions of national security ranging from the traditional to the non-traditional, all of which must be taken into account by Pakistan’s national and strategic planners.

It will be relevant for me now to go back three weeks and recall the events of India’s Operation Sindoor and of Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan um Marsoos because these are directly linked to the nuances of today’s topic of the seminar. In the Pahalgam escalation, both India and Pakistan while planning their respective operational responses and counter responses took into account the deterrence effects of the respective nuclear arsenals as well as of the operationalized technologies in the respective conventional inventories. In my opinion, both capabilities exercised a profound influence on the response options and decision making of not only India and Pakistan but also later of the international community. Today it is now nearly three weeks since a ceasefire between India and Pakistan came into force on the afternoon of 10th May after India sued for peace having received a stunning retaliatory thrashing from Pakistan after Fajar prayers that morning. Like May 1998, this once again was Pakistan’s finest hour. Operation Bunyan um Marsoos which lasted some 3-4 hours or so only, convinced India to cut further critical losses which were piling up rapidly in addition to the 1st night loss of 6 + 1 top of the line fighter aircraft and an Israeli Heron UAV. India had had enough. In the words of CNN’s Nic Robertson on the same evening, “India didn’t know what happened”, and for CNN to say that is saying a lot.

Any subsequent denials to that effect by India in order to regain the lost political ground and as part of a domestic disinformation campaign can be easily corrected by a simple replay of Colonel Sofia Qureshi’s television pleadings on the 10th afternoon that India was ready for a cease fire if Pakistan was. It was a white flag which the poor girl had been asked to put up on behalf of the 1.2 million Indian military, and on behalf of Mr Modi himself. The might and pride of India found it convenient to hide behind her. Unfortunately, the BJP-RSS goons with their poison Hindutva philosophy did not stop from dishonoring the Muslim Colonel Sofia Qureshi by labelling her as the sister of terrorists. Such is the religious frenzy and madness that rules the roost in today’s bigoted India.

It is professionally a very satisfying irony that the 28th Yom Takbir today is being celebrated by Pakistan as a yet-again vindication of the strategic choice of going nuclear in the wake of the tragedy of 1971, further reinforced by India’s 1st nuclear weapon test of 18th May 1974. In the nearly five decades since that strategic choice was made, there have been a number of occasions when Pakistan has had reasons to feel vindicated when confronted by India’s aggressive belligerence and resort to force. On each occasion Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability has emerged as not only a guarantor of Pakistan’s national security but also as a guarantor of peace and stability in South Asia by keeping India’s aggressive designs in check. Whether it was India’s Operation Brasstacks of 1986 cleverly wrapped in the garb of an exercise, or Operation Parakaram of 2001-2002 lasting nearly 10 months of futile deployment, or the failed so-called strategic strikes of 2016 and 2019, it is Pakistan’s nuclear capability which has continued to consistently generate two simultaneous strategic effects on every occasion. One, the nuclear capability, silently visible on the horizon in the background, deters India’s larger war designs and curtails the application of its military choices against a nuclear Pakistan. Two, the nuclear capability invariably shakes and spurs the international community into timely action to prevent things going out of hand between two heavily armed nuclear powers. It is in nobody’s interest to have a global Armageddon. All in all, Pakistan’s nuclear capability retains the promise of being The Great Equalizer against a much larger adversary. The recent escalation was perhaps the briefest war in modern military history, three and a half days or 87 hours to be exact. In comparison, the 1967 Arab Israeli War which had lasted almost twice the time i.e. 6 days, now seems like a very long war. I would like to highlight a few strategic notions which have emerged in the post-escalation debate. Some of these are:

  1. To begin with, India’s determination to challenge the concept of deterrence by conducting a false flag operation, was followed by a politically driven commitment trap compelling India to breakdown deterrence, escalate and physically commit forces to kinetic offensive actions by striking targets inside Pakistan and in Azad Kashmir, thereby compelling Pakistan, in turn, to undertake appropriate kinetic retaliatory actions in order to re-establish deterrence.
  2. The lead role of air power as the frontline instrument of deterrence as well as for the re-establishment of deterrence duly supported by robust ground actions by the Army, and operational deployments by the Pakistan Navy.
  3. The emergence of a variety of new normals as a consequence of the Indian escalation and Pakistan’s retaliation.
  4. The strategic role of Pakistan’s robust nuclear capability, by its sheer possession, as a deterrent to large scale operations or all-out war, as a final guarantor of peace and stability.

The reality of this shortest war, as is very well known by now, is that India started it on night 6-7 May as per its typical and predictable playbook, almost a hackneyed SOP by now. It replicated the Pulwama 2019 false flag operation, this time at Pahalgam, and used it as a casus belie but on a much larger scale of operations. It indiscriminately employed a variety of strategic, operational and tactical stand-off weapons and aerial platforms as it brazenly attacked mainland Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. In its exaggerated sense of politico-military arrogance and hubris, gross over-estimation of its own capabilities, gross under-estimation of Pakistan’s conventional capabilities especially of the Pakistan Air Force, and ignoring the nuclear environment prevailing in South Asia, India threw all caution to the wind, and tested the limits of Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear thresholds.

Please note that the much deliberately conceived and prepared for over a decade, the much invested-in, and the much hyped Cold Start Doctrine did not figure out in the Indian military’s response option. There were no reorganized Independent Battle Groups (IBGs) striking Pakistan to make their bridgeheads within 48-96 hours of an alleged terrorist event, there were no Theatre Force Reserves (TFRs) mobilizing rapidly as follow-on forces to join the early battles for a break out. There was no rush to capture Pakistan’s sensitive spaces while remaining below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. For all practical purposes, the Indian Army went missing in action. Resultantly, it now appears that the Cold Start Doctrine has been given a formal decent burial or perhaps a cremation. The Cold Start Doctrine figured out neither in February 2019 nor in May 2025.

It also appears that what the Indian armed forces, particularly the Indian Air Force, were compelled to undertake this time were selective operational missions plucked out of a newly conceived operational strategy called the Dynamic Response Strategy (DRS). The Indian DRS response strategy is in itself a major climb down from the Cold Start Doctrine because the Indian military probably concluded that the Cold Start Doctrine was much too ambitious to be undertaken given the strategic balance prevailing in the South Asian nuclear environments. It is clear by now that Pakistan’s robust nuclear weapons capability and the linked international reactions that come into play became the reason for the Indian operational climb down from the Cold Start Doctrine to a relatively less ambitious Dynamic Response Strategy. It also seems that the Indian military was not yet fully prepared and trained to undertake operations under the DRS. Additionally, critical deployments on the long Northern Front of nearly 3800 kms against China continue to remain a handicap as these deployments drain some of India’s offensive punch against Pakistan.

My sense is that India’s professional military leaders were possibly politically coerced into undertaking escalation by the strong Indian Hindutva Gang of Four, comprising of Prime Minister Modi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Home Minister Amit Shah, and the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. The military, particularly the Indian Air Force, was tasked to undertake operations beyond their professional capacities and readiness, perhaps against their better professional judgements. One would recall that the IAF Chief had only a couple of months ago gone public through a press conference on the serious inventory deficiencies of the IAF viz a viz its perceived threat of a two front war against Pakistan and China. He had openly expressed his doubts about the IAF’s readiness to undertake operations under adverse operational environments, lamenting both the quantity and the quality of forces available to him. And yet, under these relatively unfavorable operational environments, the IAF was assigned the lead role in Operation Sindoor.

The outcome of the earlier air alert of 29th April over Kashmir when the PAF locked on to four Rafael fighters and forced them to flee in panic to the safety of Srinagar rather than to their parent base at Ambala ought to have further demonstrated to the IAF the superiority of the PAF’s strategy of conducting smart integrated multi-domain operations. India nevertheless persisted with the reckless political decision of the Gang of Four of striking Pakistan for the false flag operation of 22 April at Pahalgam in order to draw political benefit for the dwindling fortunes of BJP.

As we know by now, on the night of 6-7 May the IAF attacked targets in mainland Pakistan and in Azad Kashmir with standoff weapons from within the relative safety of own air space. In a historic but intense technology driven air battle of over one hour, the PAF took the IAF on and changed the strategic balance of South Asia, I think, for a long, long, time now. Having been shot out of the skies by the PAF by losing 6 front line fighters, the IAF retreated post haste having delivered their payload while remaining inside their own air space.

The results are laid bare before the entire world to see and accept as India stands humiliated militarily, politically, and is also now displaying signs of socio-politico stress in its polity due to the stunning defeat against an adversary that India grossly underestimated on all accounts. True to form nevertheless, India has been trying to project through frivolous and utterly false propaganda, mainly for home consumption, that it scored a victory over Pakistan. To the utter disappointment of India though, none in the international community has bought the Indian story. The international media is consistently putting out convincing stories and analyses of India’s poor battle performance. The damage that was inflicted on critical Indian military assets by the Pakistani military in the 4 days cannot be hidden or wished away in this day and age of super technology. The stock markets do not lie.

These three and a half days were momentous and have brought about a major paradigm shift in the power equation in South Asia. The traditional understanding through all these years past, since 1947, since 1965, since 1971, since 1998, had been that there existed a relative asymmetry in the conventional force balance to the ever-lasting disadvantage of Pakistan viz India. Hence, it became an article of faith and a tenet of Pakistan’s strategy over the years that the development and possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, articulated through the policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence, was the Great Equalizer and Pakistan’s strategic response to the perennial operational imbalance of conventional force asymmetry.

Not anymore. On the 7th of May and then again on the 10th of May, three weeks ago, Pakistan not only surprised and stunned India but also surprised and stunned the world. What started as an escalatory war between two nuclear armed neighbours soon transited to a much larger global debate about superior Chinese technology versus western technology. The debate has invoked not only strategic implications and consequences as far away as Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, ASEAN, Europe and NATO, but also for the global arms trade industry as the stock markets reacted to reflect the ground reality of a classic technology demonstration by the Pakistan Air Force. The debate has become one of China versus France by a tennis score of 6-0. Who knows that if Modi carries out his threat of yet another round, the next set and match might also follow another tennis score of 6-0, or better still, perhaps a badminton score of 15-0.

In three and a half unforgettable days it has been firmly established that it is now the Pakistan Air Force, and not the Indian Air Force, that is the dominant air power in South Asia. The Pakistan Air Force rules the skies. When the PAF brought down the pride of Western, Russian, and Israeli technology to the ground in a matter of a few hours, the PAF had acquired a position of air superiority. The Rafael fleet was grounded and pulled back, and the IAF for all practical purposes became what we might call an LOB – Left Out of Battle. The IAF was not only out ranged by the PL15 BVR, it was also, if I may use my own term out-teched, by the deadly PAF operational strategy of multi-domain operations based on the combination of J-10, JF-17, PL-15 BVR Missiles, AWACS, EW, and an overall superior Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). In terms of strategic consequences, it seems like a modern day replay of the 1967 Arab-Israel War when on the morning of the 5th of June 1967 the Israeli Air Force in a pre-emptive strike, had decimated the combined Arab Air Forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in a matter of a few hours. The Israeli Air Force has, ever since, ruled the Middle Eastern skies unchallenged. Here in South Asia 48 years later, the balance of air power shifted inside 60 momentous minutes.

Please note that the outcome of most conventional modern wars since World War II have been shaped by air power and air domination. All military operations whether on air, land, or sea, require air superiority as the fundamental pre-requisite for operational success.

In this context, I would like to quote the extra ordinarily visionary statement from a speech of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who, while visiting PAF Station Risalpur on 13 April 1948, said, “A country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her Air Force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient Air Force, Second To None.” Let me repeat this. “…………………………………”

You will find this prophetic 1948 quotation of the Quaid at the entrance of every Base and institution of the Pakistan Air Force. The Quaid’s vision laid the foundations of the core values that Pakistan Air Force would follow for all times to come. If the Quaid was alive today, I think he would have saluted the Pakistan Air Force for delivering on his command.

Today as a consequence of Operation Sindoor, the one irrefutable new normal that has emerged with sufficient clarity is that in South Asia today the PAF rules the skies. Despite being smaller in size and initially perceived to be technologically and numerically inferior to the IAF, the PAF has smashed the Indian hubris down as it shot out of the skies the pride of India’s frontline combat aircraft: the French Rafales and Mirage-2000, the Russian SU-30 and MIG-29, and the Israeli Heron. It also added to its trophies a battery of the Russian S-400 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Weapon Systems at Adampur. Looking to the future, the PAF is now likely to fast track the induction of the J-35 Stealth fighter and the relevant PL series of BVR Missiles, as well as perhaps enhance its J-10 and PL-15 inventories. These acquisitions, which are probably not too far away, will further enhance the qualitative gap between the PAF and the IAF. Moreover, acquisition of Niche Capabilities in the multi domain fields of Cyber Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Space, etc will also enhance the PAF’s non-kinetic capabilities. The PAF proved its ascendency in all rungs and dominated the will of the enemy while creating superior effects both in kinetic and non-kinetic domains. Its synergy with the Army and the Navy also led to superiority in undertaking multi domain operations during the short period of time.

I don’t see this gap being closed by the IAF any time soon. Therefore with the IAF having been rendered to second place amounting to a PAF air superiority in South Asia, any future operations by India, notwithstanding Mr Modi’s political rhetoric, are likely to remain confined to standoff capabilities, missiles, drones, etc. But stand-off capabilities do not win wars neither can they support ground operations by the Indian Army, or Maritime operations by the IN. Operationally speaking therefore India is unlikely to resort to any meaningful use of force in the future in any configuration including maritime operations given the air superiority of the PAF.

Prime Minister Modi has talked of the emergence of a new normal in South Asia post Operation Sindoor. He is right; except that the new normal as I see it now comprises of some of the following tenets:

  1. Air superiority has changed hands. The PAF is now the dominant air power in South Asia. This is the new normal. Mr Modi and the IAF might have noted it by now howsoever reluctantly. Further, the new normal is that this dominance gap is likely to be widened with even greater technology inductions in the PAF in the near future.
  2. The new normal is that the battle proven conventional deterrent of the Pakistan Air Force has assumed a leading deterrence role in South Asia.
  3. The new normal is that Pakistan’s robust nuclear deterrence will continue to exercise strategic level deterrence in order to constrain and curtail India’s political and operational objectives and choices thereby ensuring the maintenance of relative peace and strategic stability in South Asia.
  4. The new normal is that in case of a renewed Indian conventional attack on Pakistan, which Mr. Modi is so fond of threatening despite having sued for a cease fire, Pakistan’s conventional retaliation to his escalation will always be a notch-up response as Field Marshal Asim Munir has promised. A Quid Pro Quo Plus for sure.
  5. The new normal is that it will always be India that will each time continue to preserve the tradition of seeking a cease fire after Pakistan’s intense retaliation.
  6. Interestingly, Mr. Modi, in his intense strategic wisdom, has also mentioned his new normal of a terror attack on Indian soil to be responded by a conventional attack on the pre-determined adversary, that is, Pakistan. Well, if that be so, shouldn’t this Modi doctrine and logic now work both ways? Pakistan can thank Mr Modi for opening the door to a possible Pakistani conventional attack on India if a terror attack takes place on Pakistani soil by Pakistan’s pre-determined adversary, that is, India. It is certainly not difficult to target the well-known terror planners and supporters who might be feeling secure sitting inside India.
  7. The new normal is that the old normal of international alarm will continue to compel the international community to intervene in any future Indo-Pakistani conflict and prevent hostilities from going beyond certain well defined parameters well before touching nuclear thresholds. Whether Mr. Modi likes it or not, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, which he referred to as nuclear blackmail, will continue to define the limits of India’s kinetic freedom of action.

No discussion on the current escalation will be complete without addressing India’s action of holding the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance. It is a life and death challenge thrown at Pakistan. Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) wasted no time in taking up the challenge by clearly declaring that any Indian tinkering with Pakistan’s share of water from the three allocated rivers, that is, the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab, will be treated as an act of war and therefore, will be responded to accordingly.

In this context, I would ideally first like to advise India not to test Pakistan’s resolve. There are innumerable occasions in the past when India tested Pakistan’s will and resolve, and did not find Pakistan wanting in an appropriate response. Nevertheless, in case India wishes to continue on the path of provocative insanity, it will find that Pakistan has a variety of non-kinetic and kinetic tools in its toolbox to address the act of war. On the response rung, these may range from the lowest, that is, dialogue as provided for in the Treaty itself, to the ultimate. I shall only recall to refresh the Indian leadership’s memory that in Pakistan’s oft quoted four nuclear thresholds, point number three clearly identifies economic strangulation as one of them. Do not test Pakistan’s resolve. Pakistan will never permit economic strangulation. As we celebrate Yom-e-Takbeer today it will be in the fitness of things for me to conclude by strongly reiterating that Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme will continue to remain a robust deterrent and the guarantor of peace and stability in South Asia. In the last six years India’s Hindutva infested BJP has twice tested nuclear Pakistan’s political will, resolve, and military capabilities by striking mainland Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Each time it has come out second best, in February 2019 and now again in May 2025. India would be well advised to draw lessons from the two escalations and not to repeat the folly a third time expecting different results, unless of course India wants to prove Einstein’s theory of lunacy as correct. India should rest assured that the third time around too India will find itself entangled in yet another politico-military disaster of its own making especially when it comes up against the changed operational environments due to Pakistan’s further strengthened air power, which will be the dominant force in the South Asian air space including seaward defence, as also due to the redlines imposed by Pakistan’s nuclear policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence. The latter will continue to attract international intervention limiting India’s strategic objectives to tactical employments only. Launching Brahmos and other standoff missiles from a safe distance, and employing drone warfare as the main effort are not battle winning strategies. The earlier India understands the limits to its power and absorbs the implications of the changed operational environments, the better it will be for India and for world peace.

The sane way forward would in fact be for India and Pakistan to seize the opening and the opportunity provided by President Trump’s diplomatic initiative by seriously considering taking the civilized path of dialogue and reconciliation to seriously address the conflicts plaguing South Asia. That would be statesmanship of a high order and a saner path for bringing peace and stability to South Asia. Generations will remember the leadership for giving them a chance to live in peace and security.

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