Noureen Choudry
India’s involvement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has followed an interesting track. As New Delhi strengthened ties with Washington after the Cold War, it also joined forces with Moscow and Beijing to express concerns about America’s dominance. This collaboration led to the formation of a trilateral alliance with Russia and China, followed by the broader BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The idea was that with Moscow’s support, India could balance China’s growing influence.
The rivalry between India and China is evident in various forums, with their bilateral issues being apparent. Surprisingly, in 2017, China welcomed both India and Pakistan into the SCO, a group dominated by China. China aimed to create a bloc where it could seek diplomatic support for regional projects, limiting U.S. Involvement.
Despite tensions between India and China, China expected new SCO members to be engaged constructively, linking them to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, India, as an SCO member, stands out by not supporting China’s BRI and consistently criticizing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India has even announced its own economic corridors, like the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) and India Middle East Europe Corridor (IMEC), raising questions about its SCO membership amid opposition and rivalry.
India’s delicate balancing act on the tightrope of dual roles may find itself in jeopardy sooner than later, as its political acrobatics between two extremes seem to be performed with a careless disregard for the stability of its position. While India wishes to benefit from the opportunities the organization offers, it is unwilling to cooperate with certain member countries, especially China and Pakistan. In the past, India aligned with Russia and China against American unilateralism.
However, India’s current most strategic partner is the U.S., while concerns about Chinese expansionism have risen. India’s discomfort increases as its longstanding partner, Russia, moves closer to China, and India-China relations have soured. Despite concerns about the deteriorating ties between India and China, neither country wants a serious conflict. The U.S. seeks a stronger relationship with India as the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies, considering India a vital partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy.
India maintains a policy of nonalignment amid major power competition and an emerging multipolar world. China, on the other hand, has strengthened its relationship with India’s South Asian rival, Pakistan. This Beijing-Islamabad axis has military and economic dimensions, complicating India’s diplomatic landscape.
India’s relations with the U.S., the QUAD, and Russia are not mutually exclusive, and balancing these connections becomes crucial. China envisioned the SCO as an alternative regional arrangement, aiming to present itself as a responsible major power and create a regional order with multiple countries, challenging U.S. supremacy.
Indian diplomats hoped that talks with China on the disputed border would pave the way for summit-level diplomacy in 2023. However, expectations were unmet, leading to the downgrading of the SCO summit. India may need to navigate carefully as it holds the presidency of the SCO and the G-20, with the importance of the latter declining. Striking a balance between contradictory demands from the G-20 and the SCO, especially in the Global South, requires caution rather than grandstanding.
The author is a graduate of Mass Communication and a member of RFI