Address by AD NCA, Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai NI, HI, HI(M) (R) at PIIA seminar on “Nuclear Developments – Regional and Global Impact”

NOTE: Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai NI, HI, HI(M) (R), Advisor Development National Command Authority (AD NCA), delivered an insightful keynote address at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA) seminar titled “2024 in Retrospective” on Saturday, January 25, 2025. His address centered on the topic, “Nuclear Developments – Regional and Global Impact,” offering an in-depth analysis of the consequences of nuclear advancements on both regional stability and international security. Team Interaction is pleased to publish this significant address, recognizing its strategic importance and relevance to our readers.

1.Dr Masuma Hasan, Ambassador Syed Hasan Habib, ladies and gentlemen. Assalam Alaikum and good evening. I am very happy to have been invited to speak on a subject that is critical to peace and war not only in our crisis-prone South Asia but also in the larger region around us, and perhaps in the world at large. When we look at the year 2024 in retrospect with particular reference to nuclear developments during the year and their regional and global impact, it will be relevant in the interest of perspective and continuity to make these assessments keeping in view the broader background to these developments so as to link the year 2024 logically with the past.

2. While Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability has always been a cornerstone of Pakistan’s national security for the past many decades, it has, of late, assumed even greater significance in the challenging geo-political and strategic environment that has emerged rapidly in Pakistan’s neighborhood in the last 6 years particularly. Pakistan has been riding a geo-political roller coaster of sorts.
3. Therefore, before reviewing nuclear developments in the year 2024, for their regional and global impact, I would first like to take a broader overview of the emerging strategic environments in and around Pakistan to keep things in perspective. In this context, we may not go too far back but we must consider the following 6 events in the last 6 years in and around Pakistan’s neighborhood in order to get a feel of the challenges that Pakistan faces.
4. First, the Balakot-Rajauri exchange of strategic air strikes on 26th and 27th February 2019 between the Indian Air Force and the Pakistan Air Force, consequent to India’s aggressive politico-military posture just before the Indian elections in May 2019. The two-day skirmish did not turn out too well for India. While the IAF failed to achieve its objective of striking the alleged terrorist camps at Balakot in mainland Pakistan, the skirmish resulted in the downing of two IAF aircraft by the PAF, a MIG-21 Bison and an SU-30, and the capture of an IAF pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan. A well-timed meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority at the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is responsible for the command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, sent strong signals of deterrence to India and the world and helped in restricting further spiral in hostilities. While Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence worked, India’s irresponsible conduct as a nuclear power nevertheless stood exposed before the world. The major departure in the skirmish was that for the first time since 1971, India crossed the international air space and attacked mainland Pakistan as against the established norm of land or air skirmishes on the Kashmiri LOC.
5. Second, the aggressive Indian politico-military posture against Pakistan was soon balanced strategically in the summer of 2020 by India’s somewhat forgotten military fiascos against China in Galwan, Ladakh, and Arunachal Pradesh creating a dilemma of a two-front war for India. At the strategic and military levels the development carries serious security and operational ramifications for not only India’s northern front against China but also for India’s western front with Pakistan, the LOC in Kashmir, and Siachen. China cut India and its humiliated military to size in the full glare of international publicity – without firing a bullet. The Indian military, being built up by the West to become a net security provider in the region, was humiliated by China with pre-historic war-fighting tools: sticks, hammers, swords, and stones. The US and the West simply watched. They made no attempt whatsoever to come to India’s help. India was let down not only by its military but also by its so-called international friends. India felt compelled to restore the ceasefire on the LOC with Pakistan in order to offset the possibility of a two-front war scenario. In my opinion, strategic stability between the two nuclear powers of South Asia was well served with an advantage to Pakistan.
6. Third, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 led to fair expectations in Pakistan of improved security environments on the western borders. Unfortunately, that was not to be. The Afghan Taliban soon turned on their benefactor of over four decades resulting in a deteriorating internal and external security situation on Pakistan’s western borders and in the western provinces. The Afghan Taliban’s perfidy with Pakistan has resulted in serious policy and physical clashes. India has fully exploited the bad blood situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan by funding and arming the TTP as well as the Balochistan militancy. This in some ways is a consequence of Pakistan’s robust nuclear capability having seriously curtailed India’s offensive military options on Pakistan’s eastern borders.
7. Fourth, India’s unwarranted attack on Pakistani territory by a nuclear-capable Brahmos missile in March 2022 to which Pakistan did not retaliate in kind but preferred to handle it politically and diplomatically. Notwithstanding India’s false claim that it was an accidental launch, the attack remains yet another demonstrated milestone in India’s irresponsible conduct as a nuclear power. At the very least, the incident reflects alarmingly on India’s system of command and control of its nuclear arsenal.
8. Fifth, Iran’s missile strikes on Pakistani territory near Panjgur in Balochistan in January 2024 were rather perplexing. Iran, a non-nuclear power, long enjoying supposedly friendly relations with brotherly Pakistan, violated nuclear-armed Pakistan’s territorial integrity without any worthwhile provocation. Pakistan was left with little choice but to retaliate with appropriate counterstrikes inside Iran in order to restore the superior deterrence value of Pakistan’s conventional and strategic forces. Pakistan could not have afforded to buckle under and accept the dilution of its deterrence. The in-built message of Pakistan’s counter strikes on Iran brought Iran’s foreign minister rushing to Islamabad within a week to calm down the tensions, and back off. However, when we see the incident in the context of Iran’s continued conduct of allowing India’s RAW to freely operate unhindered from Chahbahar against Pakistan, as in the arrest of the Indian Navy’s Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav, and the continued freedom and sanctuaries for the Baloch militants to operate from Irani territory against Balochistan, one seriously wonders as to what to make of Iran’s policies.
9. Sixth, while the foregoing events on Pakistan’s eastern and western borders are disconcerting and a reflection of the challenging strategic and geo-political environments, a positive development is the emerging Pakistan-Bangladesh rapprochement in the works, with inherent possibilities of mutual strategic, political, and economic benefits. The development certainly has India worried.
10. In addition to the foregoing developments in our immediate eastern and western neighborhoods, there are important lessons to be drawn for a nuclear power like Pakistan from the two ongoing high-attrition wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, and West Asia to include the genocidal war in Gaza and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
11. The Ukraine War. The fundamental lesson for Pakistan coming out of the Ukraine War is the criticality of the retention of a strong nuclear capability as a strategic deterrence for Pakistan’s national security and survival. When the former USSR collapsed, Ukraine, in a moment of strategic insanity, gave up almost 2000 nuclear weapons and the consequences are there for everyone to see. Lesson: Pakistan must continue to preserve and strengthen its nuclear capabilities against all potential threats, withstand and rebuff all international pressures, and never ever allow the slightest doubt to creep into its national and strategic determination about the centrality and criticality of its nuclear program for national security and survival. Pakistan has had that strategic clarity for 52 years through successive governments irrespective of the politics of the day, and must continue to retain that clarity forever.
12. he Wars in the Middle East and West Asia. The rapidly emerging political and military developments in West Asia have now assumed special significance for Pakistan when read in conjunction with some of the recent US actions and statements against Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program. These need to be taken and monitored with the utmost seriousness. Pakistan needs to watch very carefully the strategic developments taking place rapidly in West Asia where many of the presumed buffer states are seemingly in a state of political and military disarray and meltdown, creating strategic vacuums. The emerging strategic vacuums will then leave Pakistan’s security exposed to inimical forces in West Asia, in addition to the existing situation with India in the East.
13. China.In the geopolitical milieu of today’s global order, or disorder, it is China as the emerging superpower which poses multiple challenges to the US in the political, economic, military, and technological spheres. More than a kinetic military war, China is now preparing itself for a trade war which might be resumed by President Trump from where he left it in 2020. A trade war between the two superpowers will have strategic and economic consequences for South Asia for both India and Pakistan.
14. Pakistanis should thank our elders of many, many, decades ago who took the strategic decision of befriending China. The vision of that stroke of genius bears fruit today and Pakistan, in my opinion, will find itself on the right side of history in the coming years and decades even though much more needs to be done by Pakistan today to cash in on the historic advantage that it has inherited.
15. What are the emerging challenges for Pakistan especially because of Pakistan’s traditional and strong strategic relationship with China on the one hand as well as a long history of transactional relationship with the US on the other hand? Is a balancing act possible that would work to serve Pakistan’s national interests? How should Pakistan in the context of its security interests view and respond to the clear strategic choice that the US has made in over two decades by now, of propping up India as a counterweight to China?
16. South Asia.In the context of South Asia, we need to understand and register the strategic reality of the vital strategic balance that Pakistan is compelled to maintain in the nuclear equation viz India as THE determinant of the state of strategic stability in South Asia, particularly given the asymmetry in conventional forces. For the last many decades, it has become a Pakistani responsibility, by default, not to allow the South Asian strategic balance to be disturbed to Pakistan’s disadvantage despite India’s persistent efforts to undo it at every opportunity. Pakistan’s policy of maintaining and strengthening the policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence in the nuclear field is, therefore, central to the retention of strategic balance in South Asia. The criticality of adhering to that policy is reinforced by the eight major geo-political developments in and around Pakistan that I have just highlighted, some of these directly on Pakistani soil or on Pakistan’s eastern and western borders. The policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence has enforced peace on our eastern borders, howsoever fragile it might seem.
17. After taking a comprehensive review of the emerging strategic environments in and around Pakistan over the last 6 odd years, without going too far back, we can now connect the dots with the year 2024 as we look at it in retrospect. I shall highlight the nuclear developments that took place in 2024, with particular reference to Pakistan, as also assess their regional and global impact.
18. With reference to Pakistan, there are six events of 2024 that need to be recapped. Of these, three are good news stories, and three are not so good stories. First, the good news stories:
19. First, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 2024 continued to successfully and continuously operate Pakistan’s six civil nuclear power plants, all installed with the assistance of our ever-reliable friend China. All were completed on an average of 6 months ahead of time, and all were operated entirely by Pakistani nuclear engineers. These include the four nuclear power plants at Chashma near Mianwali with a total capacity of 1330 MWs, and the two newly commissioned KANUPP-2 and KANUPP-3 power plants at Paradise Point Karachi with a total capacity of 2200 MWs. All together in 2024, the six nuclear power plants provided the national grid with 3530 MWs of clean, reliable, safe, and relatively cheap electricity. I would count this national achievement as a silent but major Pakistani success story of 2024.
20. Second, still with the civil nuclear energy program and good news, the year 2024 saw the commencement of construction of a new nuclear power plant Chashma 5 with a capacity of 1200 MW. This too is in collaboration with China. It will be completed InshaAllah in 2030. The successive nuclear power plants are being constructed within the scope of a programme called Nuclear Energy Vision 2050, which was conceived by the Strategic Plans Division in 2011, and was developed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for implementation. Nuclear Energy Vision 2050, which is self-financing and self-sustaining, visualizes the production of 42000 MW of electricity by the year 2050, through the installation of 29 nuclear power plants spread across the four provinces. The Vision was approved by Pakistan’s National Command Authority in 2011. To put the target of 42000 MWs of electricity in perspective, while Pakistanis have agonized over the construction of the 3600 MWs Kalabagh Dam for nearly 70 years, in contrast, Nuclear Energy Vision 2050 will InshaAllah deliver in the next 25 years, 42000 MWs, which is the equivalent of nearly 11 Kalabagh Dams. I think there is life beyond Kalabagh Dam and Pakistan needs to stay the course with Nuclear Energy Vision 2050.
21. Third, still staying with good stories, Pakistan’s space program, which has strong strategic linkages with the nuclear program in addition to critical uses for civil purposes, attained a take-off stage in 2024. After years of dedicated and sustained efforts by the SPD and SUPARCO, Pakistan has been successful, with Chinese assistance, to place a number of satellites in space in the last two decades. These include Communications Satellites, Earth Observation satellites with 0.5-meter resolution for imagery purposes, and a few others. You might have read about the indigenously built EO-1 satellite launched by Pakistan earlier this month. Unfortunately, the pre-SPD story of the space program and SUPARCO is abysmal. It was only after the SPD brought SUPARCO under its wings in 2001 from the Cabinet Division that the space program got winds in its sails and started to deliver. Today, the space programme follows yet another visionary programme called Pakistan’s Space Vision 2047 which too was approved by the National Command Authority in 2011.
22. Now talking about the regional and global impact of the two foregoing visions for nuclear energy and for space. The greatest impact that we have been able to generate on certain regional and international powers that would like to isolate Pakistan strategically, is to demonstrate to them Pakistan’s strategic will to attain and retain strategic autonomy when it comes to national security. By staying the course, brushing off pressures, and forging ahead on both the critical national programs, we have further demonstrated that Pakistan has a valued strategic partner in China which will not allow Pakistan to be isolated. This demonstration was particularly necessary when in 2008, the US mainstreamed India in the international nuclear order by rushing through an exemption or waiver for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) while denying the same to Pakistan. This unequal and discriminatory treatment was balanced by Pakistan through the determined Pakistan-China cooperation in the nuclear energy and space programs. The result has been that over time, the attempts to isolate Pakistan in these two areas have been managed well by Pakistan and the international efforts have by and large lost steam.
23. I shall now move on to a few negative events that occurred in 2024 with which Pakistan has had to grapple, and will InshaAllah continue to grapple successfully. These negative events, in a series of five sub-events as part of one larger and linked plot, targeted Pakistan’s strategic missiles program in the usual discriminatory manner that Pakistan has got so used to ever since Pakistan embarked on the nuclear program in 1972. The international plot remains oblivious and insensitive to Pakistan’s genuine security concerns viz India, and of course, generously ignores India’s much larger missile and space program. Perhaps some of you may have followed these developments of 2024 in the media. Briefly, the five sub-events of the broader anti-Pakistan push, were as follows:

(1) First, on 12 September 2024, the US imposed sanctions on a Chinese research institute and several Chinese companies it said have been involved in supplying Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, especially the long-range Shaheen-3 (range 2750 km) and the 2000 km Ababeel MIRV systems. MIRV stands for Multiple Independently Targeting Re-Entry Vehicle, meaning that one Ababeel missile carries multiple nuclear warheads. Pakistan strongly rejected the charge of being the recipient of the so-called supplies.

(2) Second, on 18 December 2024, the US sanctioned one government and three private sector Pakistani entities for being allegedly involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. This absurd allegation too was rejected by Pakistan as perplexing. Pakistan has been a declared nuclear weapons power since May 1998, as indeed is India. Both countries are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan has a robust and vibrant indigenous nuclear and missile programme which is well known to the world. Why then suddenly Pakistani entities needed to be sanctioned for being involved in the development of so-called weapons of mass destruction defies logic and can be placed in the category of a mala fide act.

(3) Third, interestingly, in an act of blatant discrimination as well as stretching favoritism and absurdity to its extreme, the US on 15th of January 2025, almost simultaneously, actually removed three Indian nuclear entities from the sanctions list. These included Indian Rare Earths, Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Center, and Bhabha Atomic Research Center, all three involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. But then such are the ways of the world.

(4) Fourth, in a similar vein, one can recall the frequent incidents that continue to occur in India regarding a string of thefts and smuggling of uranium for sale on the international black market by organized cartels, as well as individuals. These are most benignly ignored by the US and other Western governments despite the strong potential for the stolen uranium to fall into terrorist hands for the purpose of making dirty bombs. AlHamdoLillah, due to Pakistan’s strong nuclear security measures, not a single story of a similar activity has ever emerged from Pakistan. One can imagine the hell that would break loose internationally if such an incident were to happen in Pakistan. Pakistan’s chief concern ought to be to highlight to the international community the possibility of a dirty bomb incident, based on India’s smuggled uranium, being sponsored by inimical forces as a false flag operation and then pinning the blame on Pakistan.

(5)Fifth, on 19 December 2024, and this one takes the cake, a new debate was sparked in Washington with regard to Pakistan’s intentions about its ballistic missiles program when Jon Finer, the outgoing US Deputy National Security Advisor gave a talk at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Finer said: “Pakistan has pursued increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems to equipment that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors…If those trends continue, Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States. The number of nuclear-armed states with missiles that can reach the U.S. homeland is very small and they tend to be adversarial,” he continued, naming Russia, North Korea, and China. “So candidly, it’s hard for us to see Pakistan’s actions as anything other than an emerging threat to the United States,” said Finer.

1. Now, when we link the five sub-events, that is, the sequential sanctions against the Chinese and Pakistani entities, along with the almost simultaneous removal of similar sanctions against Indian entities directly involved in the production of so-called “weapons of mass destruction”, followed a day later by the loaded but absurd allegation of Pakistan’s long-range missiles becoming a direct threat to the US,  the whole package as a sinister plot paints a clear picture of blatant discrimination and bias by the US against Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program while fully cooperating in the development of India’s nuclear program.
2. In this regard, I would like to say that for over five decades, since 1974, Pakistan has learned to live with US and Western sanctions generally and against its nuclear program specifically. There is nothing new in it; it’s a straightforward case of chronic indigestion that refuses to go away. The good news is that in practical terms, on the ground, the sanctions are worthless, and meaningless because Pakistan never has, and till today, does not depend on US or Western suppliers for technology or equipment. Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program has AlHamdoLillah matured over five decades to the point that today it is indigenous and that is its inherent strength.
3. What is new however and, once again if I may use the words perplexing and absurd, is the US insinuation that Pakistan’s missile program is in pursuit of long ranges that may target the US itself. The insinuation is mind-boggling. Why on earth would Pakistan, in all its sanity, want to commit national suicide by bringing the sole superpower of the world, the United States of America in its cross-hair defies all bounds of logic? The US is 12000 km from Pakistan. I am lost for words as to which of Pakistan’s modest range missile systems, which barely cover India, Mr Finer had in mind before going public with such a profound charge. The only conclusion that I can possibly draw is that the Indian lobby in the US, which has not only attained a very strong voice in the US but has also penetrated and acquired important placements in the US industry, bureaucracy, and government, is now in a position to influence and shape US policies, to its advantage at least in South Asia. It has likely sponsored this new bogey of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program becoming a threat to the US itself in the dying days of the Biden Administration basically to flag the allegation as a future agenda point for follow-up by the incoming Trump Administration, which now consists of, as already announced, some key senior office holders who are on record as being strongly pro-India. Pakistan’s leadership and diplomacy have their work cut out and will have to face the challenges squarely.
4. Before I end, I shall briefly mention three nuclear developments on the international scene in 2024 not linked to Pakistan or South Asia. One pertains to the war in Ukraine, while two pertain to the Middle East.
5. First, in the Ukraine war, in May and June 2024, in an effort to discourage the West from ramping up support for Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus conducted tactical nuclear weapons drills as a message to the West that in extreme situations, Russia could resort to the use of tactical nukes. Russia had been warning about the possibility since 2022 but then upped the ante in 2024 to further impose caution. The West however did not take the message seriously and continued arming Ukraine.
6. Earlier in November 2023, Russia had announced that it was withdrawing its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was a signal to the West that Russia would be free to conduct nuclear tests of a variety of nuclear weapons as it deemed fit. The withdrawal of the CTBT ratification also brought Russia’s position at par with the USA which has signed but not ratified the CTBT. This first step by Russia in the nuclear realm in 2023 had apparently not impressed the West, and so in conjunction with Belarus, Russia took the next step on the escalatory ladder of signaling the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Thereafter, however, as the US November elections approached, Russia probably decided to go slow on nuclear signaling in anticipation or hope of a Trump victory. As it turned out, the Russian gamble in exercising nuclear restraint paid off with a Trump victory. President Trump of course is committed to ending the Ukraine war soonest, as indeed he has ended the Israeli war of genocide in Gaza even before his formal inauguration by a simple threat to both Hamas and Israel.
7. Second, in the Middle East, in continuation of its war against Hamas and Hezbollah all through 2024, Israel toyed seriously with launching air strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. When Iran twice launched missile and drone strikes against Israel, Israel retaliated with conventional air strikes against Iran’s military infrastructure, especially against Iran’s air defenses as a possible prelude to air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. For some days and weeks, the possibility seemed like a touch-and-go affair but Israel stopped just short of such strikes possibly on the advice of the US.
8. Third, again in the Middle East, I shall mention only in passing yet another nuclear development of 2024 on the nuclear front, this is a positive one, in the realm of nuclear energy for civilian use. For some years now, there has been an encouraging trend in the Middle East to diversify energy sources beyond oil. The UAE pioneered the trend in 2009 by signing a contract with South Korea for 4 nuclear reactors of 1400 MWs each making a total of 5600 Mws. Accurate cost estimates are not available and vary from USD 20 billion to USD 32 billion. Three out of the four plants, all under IAEA safeguards, and located at Barakah in Abu Dhabi, were sequentially commissioned in 2021, 2022, and 2023. The fourth one was commissioned last year in September 2024. A point of interest that I would like to highlight on a comparative basis between Pakistan and the UAE is the importance and value of decision-making and availability of funds. I stated earlier with much pride that Pakistan today produces 3530 MWs of nuclear energy from 6 power plants at Chashma and Karachi. These six plants were constructed over 30 years from 1992 to 2022 and generated 3530 MW. And here is the UAE, awash with cash and quick decision-making, producing 5600 MWs from 4 nuclear power plants constructed over 14 years from 2009 to 2024.
9. Also in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, taking a cue from the UAE, is now seriously considering nuclear energy as an additional diversified energy source. In fact, one of the pre-conditions that the Saudis have placed in the Abraham Accords for recognition of Israel is the provision of nuclear power plants. It remains to be seen if the Saudis will be allowed to move on that path.
10. To conclude, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to recap a few points that I have made:

a.Pakistan’s security environments have always been under variable pressure for the most part of our existence and Pakistan’s strategic planners have responded to these in their wisdom from time to time. If there is one aspect that stands out it is that having established a robust nuclear capability articulated through the policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence, Pakistan has closed the doors to large-scale wars with India perhaps forever, if I may. This is central to Pakistan’s national security and a huge achievement that Pakistan, despite relative asymmetry in the conventional force equation, has literally enforced and compelled peace in South Asia; this success has deflected India into low-cost warfare on our western borders and western provinces is something that Pakistani planners must seriously worry about and develop more coherent response options in the socio-politico-military fields in order to restore true overall peace and stability.

1. I have highlighted both good and not so good stories of 2024 in the domain of nuclear Pakistan. The future, as always, will remain challenging which is the outcome, in part of Pakistan’s strategic and central geographic location as a trade and strategic corridor to Central Asia, in part because of Pakistan’s robust relationship with China whose rise is unfortunately seen as a threat by the US and, in part because of Pakistan’s determination not to compromise ever on its nuclear program. Pakistan has its work cut out to work in all sincerity, wisdom, and energy to enhance the critical elements of its national power potential including the economy and healthy national cohesion.
2. In my assessment, the year 2024 in retrospect has by and large been a fairly normal regulation year. This I say strictly from the point of view of the topic given to me, that is, nuclear developments and their regional, and global impact. While this informed audience is very familiar with the history of Pakistan’s strategic and geo-political environments over the many decades of Pakistan’s existence, I have linked only the preceding period of the last 6 years with the year 2024 in order to frame the events within the context of the immediate geo-political background. It is in that context that I describe 2024 as a normal regulation year. If some of the events that I have highlighted had not taken place I think the year would probably have been quite boring.
3. I thank you.